Image Courtesy: manhhai (flickr)

–Anuradha M. Chenoy

(First published in The Economic and Political Weekly, April 16, 2022, Vol.LVII No. 16, pp.10-13)

The Russian illegal war in Ukraine has accelerated a shift in the world order forcing a renewed balance of power.  Countries and analysts are calculating the implications of re-balancing and positioning for significant changes. Ukraine is ravaged; Russia is the aggressor and will suffer long term consequences, the US led NATO has strengthened and forcing the re-balance, Europe is undergoing a human security crises and remilitarization, China has made a strategic choice,  India like many countries of the Global South faces geostrategic pressure as they calibrate their positions. So what are these shifts,  the implications and consequences? 

A brief on this war

The Russian motives in launching this war on Ukraine include a mix of: aspirations for projecting Russian imperial power status and vision; extend influence and support to Russian ethnic and other dissatisfied minorities in the former Soviet Republics;  re-creating a Russian sphere of influence to counter balance the Western one in Eurasia; opposition to NATO expansion, especially the inclusion of Ukraine;  attempt to destroy the Ukrainian military infrastructure to enforce neutrality before NATO could undermine Russia; the  creation of an Eastern Ukraine buffer for Russian security in the Donbas region with the Russian ethnic majority provinces that had declared themselves independent of Donetsk, Luhansk, Crimea, all which give Russia strategic control over the Black Sea. 

Russia is unlikely to achieve all these ambitions. On the contrary this asymmetric  war, like many before will have debilitating long term effects on both Ukraine and Russia as the West places sanctions and isolates Russia. The world but especially the Developing Countries face continuous oil price volatility, grain shortages, supply chain disruptions and economic stagflation. This war has serious consequences internationally marking a shift in the world order that we examine. 

The US Long Term Strategic Plan

The US is key in the planning, the unfolding and the outcome of this war that has given them an opportunity for a renewed grand strategy.  They laid the ground work by promoting continuous hostility to Russia for two decades;  provided material support like advanced weapons, aid, assistance and advice to Ukraine at least since 2014¹; lent their unmatched soft power and convincing narrative of democracy versus authoritarianism, good versus evil before and during the war and are now ready with the US long term plan for the new phase in international politics.  Russia believed for many years that the Cold War ended with the Soviet collapse and they did try and negotiate with the US. But for the US the Cold War never ended. They continued to see Russia as the threat to a NATO led by the US.

President Biden calls the new phase for global primacy as ‘Strategic Competition’².  The  strategic crowd in Washington refers to this as  ‘Great Power Competition’ or GPC³.   The earlier geostrategic phase (2001-2021) termed  the ‘war on terror’  is over.  The withdrawal of US troops and NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan in August 2021 appeared shabby, defeatist and hastily conducted but was  as per plan. Biden had already declared in his ‘Interim National Security Strategic Guidance’ document, March, 2021 that global dynamics have shifted and the US needs to reclaim its strategic advantage. The first step towards this was a withdrawal from the ‘forever wars’, of the devastated  Middle East (West Asia) region. The US long confrontation and isolation with Iran however remains their main interest in the region. 

The central focus of GPC-Great Power Competition for the US is China. Any number of documents and speeches since the Obama declaration of ‘rebalance’ and ‘pivot to Asia’ point to this⁴. The Air-Sea Battle Doctrine (2010) centred China as the focus of a hybrid and military confrontation. The Biden Administration has clubbed China and Russia together as targets. This twinning is deeper than practiced by the Trump administration that appeared contradictory over its Russia policy. The US deep state however has been consistent: “Today, every domain is contested- air, land, sea, space and cyberspace⁵.” The conclusion- that China is the challenger and Russia is the secondary major threat. 

US Strategists are convinced that a long war in the Ukraine war will weaken Russia irreparably.   Ukraine is being heavily armed by the US and NATO, as General Milley, Chairman Joint Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff testified to the US Congress that this conflict would last for years and that US and NATO would be ‘involved in this for a long time’⁶.  In this event the US calculates that Russia will be an economic strain on China and the Russia-China strategic alliance gets one sided, therefore beneficial for the US primacy and competition with China. 

The Russian aggression has given the US the opportunity for its already planned strategic competition. The public outrage on the Ukraine war  has subdued the virtual civil war between the Democrats and Republicans forming a  bi-partisan consensus. (Klare, 2022). The US defence budget and military assistance to Ukraine has increased, Russia is increasingly sanctioned, Russian economy is showing signs of stress, Russian citizens are divided as many oppose this war. The US global strategy is unfolding. But it is not unchallenged.

The US as Europe’s Lead

To prepare for Great Power Competition with the Russia China double threat Biden has repeatedly called on allies to both counter the Russian threat and ‘prepare together for long-term strategic competition’ and to push back against the ‘Chinese Government’s economic abuses and coercions that undercut the foundations of the international  economic system’⁷.  European partners are now open on increasing defence budgets, Germany has increased its defence spending and changed legal provisions to provide arms to a country (Ukraine) in conflict. The Nord Stream Pipeline from Russia has not been commissioned.  France that was miffed because the US cut them out of a deal on nuclear submarines with  the Australia, by signing the US, UK, Australia (AUUKUS) Agreement has fallen in line. 

The Minsk I and II Agreement that were the hope of a negotiated peace led by France and Germany with Ukraine and Russia are not spoken about. States like Poland welcome refurbished bases and increased NATO activity in Central East Europe. The strategic agency of select European powers is at hold. However, most of Europe still does not want to be part of the US grand strategies for primacy. They are aware that European interdependence and development needs a sustainable engagement with Russia and Eurasia as a whole. 

Great Power Competition in the  Asia Pacific

The attention of GPC and NATO is centred in the Asia Pacific around the South China Sea and Taiwan.  Major US allies -Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore have placed sanctions on Russia and see China as the major threat. Militarization is stepping up, with Australia’s order of nuclear sub marines from the US and UK and creation of a space force something which they had escaped even during the Cold War period⁸.  The QUAD partnership of US, Japan, India, Australia has engaged in military exercises in the region. China considers QUAD and AUUKUS “quasi NATO” alliances. India’s strictly neutral position during the Ukraine war has shaken QUAD partners. Other such mini alliances are on the cards.

Deglobalization

International political economy is changing course to keep in step with strategic competition. The West after forty years of globalization calculated that they have lost out to China, India and other emerging countries. To bring back manufacturing they are looking at greater protectionism and barriers as part of a de-globalization process⁹. Here too China is presented as the main threat, but the emerging economies will be hit as the sanctions on Russia hit global trade, supply and value chains. Trade deals like the Trans Pacific Partnership between the US and Asian countries are presented as encircling an economically unfair China. 

The Senate Strategic Competition Act, 2021, frames China as hostile, as a threat and ‘malign’  to US interests, where negotiations are not possible:   The least developed countries suffer the most, as they recently witnessed vaccine protectionism where Western policy was- when the world suffers a pandemic, put up your barriers (India and South Africa’s attempt for special exemptions on TRIPs, supported by a 100 Developing Countries remains blocked). Within this deglobalization phase, neoliberal  economic and financial practice  continue with rules to coordinate closely with multinational companies and IFIs to give them strategic direction. 

The Chinese Response 

China recognises that they are the primary adversary of the US in the Great Power Competition, the focus on Russia is temporary while strategic coercion against China is constant. China has not named Russia as an aggressor in the Ukraine war, has opposed NATO expansion and sanctions and calls for diplomatic solution while recognising Russia’s ‘legitimate security concerns’. Xi’s conversation with Biden showed the replay of cold hostility¹¹.  If Biden warned China on material support to Russia, Xi in turn warned Biden about ‘playing with fire’ on Taiwan saying, ‘He who bells the tiger will have to take it off ’.¹² China is building defences as the US prioritises its military presence in  the Asia Pacific and  creates an international coalition to isolate China and Russia. 

China does not want to be bracketed with Russia and asserts its sovereign position. China call this war ‘the situation’, has supported Russia in the Security Council and UN General Assembly.  The US has  warned them about possible “implications” and “consequences”¹³.  Chinese  strategic thinkers believe that US attempts to weaken this Sino-Russian  partnership that is described as one with  “no-limits” cannot succeed because Russia gives them strategic depth, supports their energy and food needs and can help them face any US threat¹⁴.  Russia and China have since years been putting in place institutions for trade in local currencies like the Rubble – Renminbi trade. The Chinese have chosen sides. Clearly all sides are preparing  for  possibilities and challenges in the Asia Pacific.¹⁵  The Chinese are watching and as they say: watch your capabilities and bide your time.

India, Global South

The US is looking to form an international coalition against Russia  that will meld into their long term strategic competition. The US is in no mood to tolerate neutrality, non-alignment or strategic autonomy that characterises the positions taken by India and many developing countries. The attempt to forge a multipolar world by several countries like those in BRICS is under serious threat.  The US vision of a renewed unipolar world demands allegiance. 

India’s stance of neutrality, abstentions during the voting in the Security Council and UN resolutions that condemn the Russian invasion have drawn international attention. India is under extraordinary pressure from the US and its allies. Biden’s inner circle from Secretary Antony Blinken, Victoria Nuland and others to convince India to shift position that Biden has called ‘shaky’. 

India’s position is to balance between Russia which is a historically time tested strategic partner  and the US- a new strategic ally that India is forging ties with given their unresolved tensions with China and Pakistan. India needs both partnerships and there is no other way for them except neutrality.

India’s defence, hydrocarbon and trade relations with Russia cannot be jeopardized when 50% of Indian defence comes from Moscow.  India is leveraging its relations with the US to ensure that these cannot be at the cost of its partnership with Russia or the global South. There is consensus of political forces within India on this position of neutrality. 

Indian strategic thinkers believe they cannot get involved in wars waged by great powers. In an unsettled non normative unstable multi polar world, with  many uncertainties,  India needs to tread the tightrope and focus on domestic growth. India will try and maintain strategic neutrality as part of their goal. Even as they joined the QUAD, they have tried to restrain this grouping to non-targeted military exercises, focus on technology, climate and trade. The Indian position is similar to many countries of the Global South. 

 Countries of the South have broadly four different positions as shown up during voting in the UN General Assembly and  statements around this. 

A few  condemn Russian aggression and  place sanctions (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Cambodia, Fiji, Kenya). A second larger group condemn the invasion,  hedge this with statements on Russia’s ‘legitimate security concerns’,  oppose sanctions and maintain neutrality (Most of ASEAN, many African and Latin American countries.) The third group of about 40 have adopted  neutrality and strategic silence, abstentions in UN  (South Asia, Brazil, Laos, Mongolia, Vietnam, India, South Africa, several African and Latin American countries). The fourth smaller group remain sympathetic to Russian positions (China, some Central Asian Republics).

Even though developing countries are committed to  safeguarding national sovereignty, favour international law since it protects vulnerable small states, and oppose secessionist movements that threaten to break up states (many developing countries   face secession movements), yet they have chosen neutrality. Reasons include that many  of these countries depend on Russia especially for arms trade. Many source their hydrocarbons, grain, fertiliser and other commodities.

The US position and NATO expansion is viewed as a continuity of the ‘Great game’ replaced by  great power competition. Most countries in the South have little interest in partisanship in  a war between Russia and the US led NATO, where Ukraine is a victim. The discourse from strategists linked to these countries  have argued Russia’s security interests are legitimate; no country can tolerate  targeting by missiles on its border and an expanding  military alliance- NATO. The South has witnessed two decades of Russian appeals, talks, concessions  and believes that that the US could have helped in the resolution of the conflict and the Minsk Accords (2104) They favour the proposal of Ukraine as a neutral zone. They want a quick compromise and return to diplomacy.

Unlike the Central East European countries, developing countries do not see Russia as a threat or as former colonial and racist power.  Russian and Chinese unconditional development aid supports many least developed countries.  Russian assistance during US/NATO interventions, colour revolutions,  regime change and bombing in Iraq,  Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan  and others just in the last twenty years. For example President Obama alone dropped 20,000 bombs¹⁶. Madeline Albright’s public statement (1996) that the sanctions that had led to the death of thousands of Iraqi children ‘had been worth it’¹⁷ has created impressions in the minds of the Global South.

The South has internalised the contradictions and double standard of moral grounds where normative principles of human rights coincide with geostrategic interests, for example on the Palestine question or the US support to Saudi Arabia in their war on Yemen. Make no mistake, the regimes of the South are no holders of normative values themselves and weigh primarily national and even pure interests to their own regime’s stability. They would also maybe take similar imperial steps as the great powers do, given half a chance. But history has given them a place in this hierarchic unequal world order, and they similarly justify and legitimise their positions with normative examples.

Clearly countries of the South are no paragons of normative virtue. Normative values are held primarily by peace and social movements, many of which are under stress in the South. Democracy for which the US claims to be fighting is being hollowed out internationally and this war can increase that trend. 

The most dire consequences of this war are the possibilities of expanding the  theatre of war beyond the borders of Ukraine. It has been a wise step to make sure that no acts provoke such expansion, even though some parties may be interested in a long war. At the same time, no side has given in for compromises that are essential for a sustainable and dignified resolution. 

 This war threatens the international non-proliferation regime and encourages many countries to enhance nuclear capabilities. The vision of extended influence by Russia, the US’s grand strategy of deadly competition with China and other great powers’ regional imperial designs have the potential for reviving conventional and hybrid warfare. The US for example has no existential or security threat in Europe. But it has an existential threat in climate, economic crises at home. Clearly, the existential threats for all peoples are climate change, destruction of ecology, increasing social inequity between and within nations. This is what needs to be addressed.

Conclusions:

The unjustified aggression of Russia on Ukraine has led to the devastation of an independent country-Ukraine. Russia itself will have long term debilitating consequences as the West cuts them off from many globalised financial systems. The US pans for global primacy have been accelerated. Many countries are calibrating their positions as we have shown. The carbon foot print of this war and the fast paced global militarization are a step back for the goals of a common future for mankind. Militarist alliance like NATO and others need to introspect their exclusive and negative role. There is no alternate to common and collaborative security which is inclusive. Further, the  double standards in implementing human rights and selective wars of aggression on smaller states by great powers have led to a delegitimization of multilateral institutions and a world that is insecure for all. If this is a war for saving democracy and human rights then international bodies like the UN and Security Council should be democratized. Refugees from all countries be treated with respect and norms for a more equitable world system be initiated. 

References

1. See for examples comments from several important American strategists like Chas Freeman, Russia in Global Affairs, Oct-December 2021: 130 at https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/122-136.pdf ; J. Mearsheimer and others.
2. Biden, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, White House, March 2021) at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf
3.  US Congressional Research Service, Report to the Congress on Great Power Competition, December 2021. At: https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21170190/renewed-great-power-competition-implications-for-defense-issues-for-congress-dec-21-2021.pdf accessed 16 March, 2022)
4. White House Fact Sheet (2015) “Advancing the Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific”  November 16, Washington, at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific
5. 2018 National Defence Strategy, Summary” at: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-advancing-rebalance-asia-and-pacific
6. General Mark Milley, Testimony to the US Congress, April 5, 2022, quoted in CBS News at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-conflict-years-mark-milley-house-armed-services-committee/
7. J. Biden, Speech, March 2021, Munich, at: https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/biden-urges-european-allies-to-prepare-strategic-competition-with-china-121021901535_1.html
8. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-21/defence-dutton-flags-future-trump-space-force/100927320
9. Kornprobast M and John Wallace, (2021) What is deglobalization? Chatham House, October 18, at: https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/5/1305/6363969 And see special issue of International Affairs (UK) on Deglobalization, September 2021, No. 27 Volume, 5.
10.  Strategic Competition Act, 2021, at:    https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/senates-strategic-competition-act-will-make-china-us-relations-worse-not-better/
11.  Biden-Xi Meeting, March 19, 2022, BBC at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59301167
12.  Xi Jinping, quoted in Times of India, 20 March, 2022, at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/china-snubs-us-says-he-who-tied-bell-to-the-tiger-must-take-it-off/articleshow/90329640.cms
13. The Guardian, 14 March, 2022,  At: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/mar/13/jake-sullivan-biden-national-security-adviser-china-russia
14. Hu Xijin, (2022) “Russia is a crucial partner for China in deterring US, Global Times, March 22, at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202203/1256525.shtml
15. Putin -Xi Joint declaration in February 4, 2022,  agrees on many issues that include- no foreign intervention in CAS; opposition to NATO expansion. President’s website: http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770
16. Harriet Agherholm, (2017) Maps show where President Barak Obama dropped his 20,000 bombs, January 17, The Independent, UK, at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-president-barack-obama-bomb-map-drone-wars-strikes-20000-pakistan-middle-east-afghanistan-a7534851.html )
17. https://www.newsweek.com/watch-madeleine-albright-saying-iraqi-kids-deaths-worth-it-resurfaces-1691193

Michael Klare https://mondediplo.com/2022/03/04ukraine-us 

Russia, Ukraine, and the New Bipartisanship in Washington and
 https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/russia-ukraine-bipartisanship/

End Notes