23-24 Sept. 2019, Berlin

Jun Kyu Lee
(Senior Researcher, Institute for Unification and Peace Policy, Hanshin University, Republic of Korea)

1. As a citizen of divided country/nation which is the legacy of the Cold War, it is a very impressive experience to make a presentation on the Korean Peninsula and East Asia in Berlin.

Compared to last year when drastic changes were a constant, the current situation on the Korean Peninsula following the ‘Hanoi No Deal’ is moving along step by step on a steep path. In June, the DPRK (North Korea), US, and the ROK (South Korea) had a lightning meeting at Panmunjom but official negotiations between the DPRK and the US have not yet resumed.

The current conjuncture of peace in international politics surrounding the Korean Peninsula has been constructed by the improvement of inter-Korean relations. Representative examples include the Pyongchang Winter Olympic Games, and three inter-Korean summits held on April 27, May 26 and from September 18 to 20 in 2018.   However, the deadlock in the DPRK-US negotiations has restrained the process of improving inter-Korean relations, and recently, the DPRK’s propaganda media have reinforced its tone of criticism against the South.

It seems clear that the DPRK is considerably dissatisfied with the ROK. In fact, the ‘Yongbyon card’ – permanently closing Yongbyon nuclear complex – proposed at the Hanoi Summit, which the US refused, was specified in the Joint Declaration by the Two Koreas’ Summit talks held in Pyongyang from 18 to 20 September 2018. In addition, various agreements between the South and the North are rarely implemented due to US and UN sanctions against the DPRK.

Of course, there have been small but significant advances such as the demilitarization of the DMZ, the halt of hostile and military action near the demarcation line, maritime peace zone in the West Sea and so on. In addition, at present, the peace process on the Korean Peninsula cannot move forward due to Washington’s reluctance to formally end the Korean War and initiate a peace agreement and treaty meeting.

The DPRK has launched and tested short-range missiles ten times since May this year, ‘subtle’ actions nevertheless still perceived by the South as a threat without provoking the US Trump administration and violating the North-South agreement.

According to media reports from the ROK and the US, there is a possibility that a working group dialogue may begin between the DPRK and the US by the end of September2019. DPRK’s government-running media also mentioned the possibility of resuming the dialogue. But we can most certainly not just ignore the current situation and simply be optimistic about the future of DPRK-US negotiations.

By the way, Bolton resigned or was fired- Bolton said “resigned” and Trump said “fired”. Anyway, Bolton’s resignation is not so much important. The problem is Trump’s unpredictability. Recently, the signal from Washington is not bad. Particularly Trump criticized the ‘Libya Model’ and mentioned “New Approach”.

2. In my opinion, in the background of the failure in the Hanoi Summit there are fundamental differences in the parties’ approach to the denuclearization process and the future of the Korean Peninsula.

Firstly, as you may have learned, the DPRK wanted a step-by-step approach while the US sought a drastic “big deal” to reach an agreement on everything. The Americans came to Hanoi seeing the DPRK’s WMDs as the central problem and tried to get the Kim Team to agree to comprehensive disarmament of his nuclear and biochemical arsenal. The North Koreans sought to entice them to agree to an initial confidence building measure as the first step toward a more comprehensive agreement in the long run. ¹

In addition, the so-called Bolton Document, which was handed over to Kim Jong Un on the second day of the summit talks, contained contents that could clearly be interpreted as an insulting ‘surrender request’ from the DPRK’s perspective.²

Secondly, what the peace process of the Korean Peninsula is attempting to address now, is the complete denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula, not of North Korea alone. There is a difference in the understanding of the concept of denuclearization. If properly grasped as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, this would entail a change in some form or another in the US nuclear forces and/or its “nuclear umbrella” as unavoidable.

The DPRK has not presented to neither the US nor ROK such a demand as a withdrawal of or breakaway from its “nuclear umbrella” through the course of negotiations up to now. Yet it has demanded the end to hostile policies towards North Korea from the US, therefore including a change in the offensive US nuclear forces, that we cannot overlook. Whether the change means merely the retreat of the currently forward deployed US nuclear forces or the ROK’s breakaway from the “nuclear umbrella” will be up pending negotiation agreements.

The future vision of a peaceful Korean Peninsula which was agreed upon with the “Pyongyang Declaration” in September of last year is “(we agreed) to make the Korean Peninsula a land of peace with no nuclear threat and no nuclear weapons”. We, therefore, must think about how to address the nuclear threat from the US, which Japan and the ROK has so far regarded as the “nuclear umbrella” and deterrence. According to the joint statement, complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula can only be accomplished through trust building, new relations between the DPRK and the US, and peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

3. We need to note the achievements of the three inter-Korean summit talks last year. We can picture the journey of the ongoing conjuncture of peace on the Korean Peninsula. We may call this journey ‘Korean Peace process’.

In the Panmunjom Declaration, the two Korea’s leaders declared that there will be “no more war on the Korean Peninsula”. Additionally,

• Improvement and development of inter-Korean relations, including the establishment of a joint liaison office in the Kaesong area, the resolution of humanitarian issues, multi-faceted exchanges & cooperation and so on.
• Joint efforts to defuse military tensions and to substantially lower the risk and danger of war on the Korean peninsula. (=> war-preventing measures, confidence-building measures (CBMs), arms controls).
• Building a permanent and stable peace regime on the Korean peninsula.  Bringing an end to the current unnatural state of armistice and establishing a firm peace regime on the Korean peninsula is a historic mission that must not be delayed any further. (Peace Regime or Peace System)

The third part of the declaration reaffirmed the non-aggression agreement and mentioned “carrying out disarmament”. In the declaration, the two Koreas agreed to declare an end to the Korean War and promote holding meetings to replace the existing Armistice Agreement with a Peace Agreement and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime. The two Koreas confirmed this as realizable through complete denuclearization.

Particularly, I would like to note the third part which is, in my opinion, the definition of Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula. According to the definition, this peace regime will be constructed by a peace agreement, arms control and disarmament, including denuclearization.

The Military Agreement, a sub-agreement of the Pyongyang Joint Declaration (19 Sept. 2018), has provided concrete shape to the agreement between the two Koreas. As I mentioned earlier, the military agreement includes various measures alleviating military tension and avoiding war such as Maritime Peace Zone, Demilitarization of JSA, Demilitarization of DMZ, Removing Landmines in DMZ and so on.

The concept of common security includes the peaceful resolution of conflict, self-restrictions, interdependence of security not deterrence, arms control, arms reduction and disarmament. The contents of the declaration are connected to the principles of common security.

“The conflict that broke out on the Korean Peninsula in June 1950 was inextricably connected to the earlier conflicts of the Asia-Pacific War and Chinese Civil War, and to tensions that continued long after 1953.” 

“The armistice document was supposed to be the first step toward a more general and lasting peace treaty. Going on 2018, that treaty has yet to be signed. Without a peace process to bring together the neighboring countries of Northeast Asia, the dangerous fissures between them, which had been drastically deepened by the war, festered rather than being healed.”

-Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Korean War in Asia: a hidden history, 2018

Whatever the case, the above agreement is meaningful. Building a peace regime/system should not be recognized only as rewards to the DPRK. This is a peace process from the perspective of positive peace. From a so-called realistic perspective, it is far more feasible to push denuclearization by advancing the “Peace Process” on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK has been obsessed with the development of asymmetric warfare capabilities such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to overcome the isolation caused by the collapse of the Cold War on an international level and its inferiority to the military power of South Korea and the ROK-US alliance. For these reasons, the process of establishing a peace regime, including the alleviation of military tensions, arms control and disarmament, are necessary for the DPRK to proceed with denuclearization.

‘The opinion on the peace process in Korea’ which 55 NGOs issued on April 3 this year emphasized “Denuclearization as Peacemaking Process”. The joint statement, published at an international forum held by 20 civil associations from the ROK and Japan, held in Seoul from May 30 to 31 this year, specified that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula, including a peace agreement, the normalization of DPRK-US relations, DPRK-Japan relations and so on, should be carried out simultaneously and in parallel.

4. Some people point out that last year’s agreements between the two Koreas lack a Northeast Asian level/regional level vision. However, the agreements need to be understood in line with many of the previous agreements on the Korean Peninsula regarding nuclear issues.

For example, Six Party Talks and one of their results is ‘9.19 Joint Statement’

In ‘9.19 Joint Statement’ on 19 September 2005, the DPRK and ROK, two Koreas, the United States, China, Russia and Japan committed joint efforts for promoting security cooperation for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

Indeed, ‘2.13 Agreement’ in 2007, an agreement to determine a follow-up for the ‘9.19 Joint Statement’, included setting up a working group for security cooperation in Northeast Asia. The full title of ‘2.13 Agreement’ is Initial Actions for the Implementation of the 9.19 Joint Statement. Specifically, in the agreement “the Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in order to carry out the initial actions” and the fifth working group was “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism”.³

The agreements agreed to, in the process between the two Koreas and international efforts to resolve Korean Questions have great implications not only for the Korean Peninsula but also for the future peace order in Northeast Asia and East Asia.

¹ Jae-Jung Suh, “From Singapore to Hanoi and Beyond: How (Not) to Build Peace between the U.S. and North Korea” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Volume 17 Issue 10 Number 1, May 15, 2019.

²Reuter’s article, 30 March, 2019.

³Working groups: “Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”, “Normalization of DPRK-US relations”, “Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations” and “Economy and Energy Cooperation”.