Kamal Mitra Chenoy writes on  ‘Asian Regional Security Complexes and Common Security’. This article, presented at the AEPF-IPB Conference Berlin (2019) shows with the use of two case studies, Afghanistan and second of the Chinese methods in Asian relations, the real need for a Common Security plan. He argues that peace and social movements should promote a common Eurasian Security and update the Common Security Report initially made by the Brandt and Palme Commission.

It is logical that common security would be of utmost benefit to states and people. ‘Common Security’ as a concept was popularized in Europe by Olaf Palme, Willy Brandt and others, but remained neglected in later years. I examine what are possibilities of promoting a common security in Asia. 

Historically Asian states have engaged in militarized security alliances promoted by  the West and Cold War rivalries. For example many states sided with one side during the Cold War period, joined military alliances and had military bases. But Asian States with others from the South also have the history of strategic autonomy promoted by the Non-Aligned Movement, which began in the 1960’s and was able to negotiate with the North in the 1980’s, but has lost its grip in this decade. Several regional associations from ASEAN, SAARC, SCO, and others that focus primarily on regional collective security and trade issues have been experimented with. But common security has been eluded between Asian States.  The reasons include:

1. There is a hierarchy and deep asymmetry within Asian States: China, India, Japan, have become regional hegemons, aspiring to major power status. They are surrounded by small states that use geopolitics between states to leverage their own security and interests.

2. Multiple contradictions and tensions between Asian states prevent common security planning. For example the unresolved issues between India-Pakistan, India -China, China-Japan, China-Vietnam, Japan- South Korea increase rivalries between them. Many of these states would resist an unconditional common security document. For example, India would not entertain a document unless it names Pakistan’s use of terror, just as Pakistan would not sign a document without mentioning the disputes over Kashmir with India. Small states are pressured by China, who would like to be seen as their ‘protector’. 

3. Multiple regional Associations from ASEAN, SCO, SAARC, and others do function, but there are  simultaneous ‘zones of influence’, maritime transgressions and disputes.

4. There are multiple security complexes and competing geo-strategic interests which include US-Russia, US-China, all of which influence Asian states who are pressurized to take sides. There are also the independent interests of regional powers like India, China and Japan.

Two case studies reveal this complexity:  

 Case I. 

Afghanistan is caught in multiple security complexes: Years of geo political competition between the USA and Russia; strategic interests of South Asia (Pakistan and India), China, Central Asia, West Asia. The consequence is that peace and development has been externalized. Local forces have been largely excluded and people made subjects by local, ethnic community based and national level war lords. Regional  rivalries like those between Pakistan and Iran or Pakistan and India have deepened internal rivalries as regional actors back local war lords. The overall conditions become dependent on military factors. (Harpvikan and Tadjbakhash ) Simultaneous with the use of force and fear the political economy of conflict promotes illegal trafficking from commodities and people and drugs like the poppy growing and drug exports. Currently the US and the Taliban have negotiated a ‘peace deal’. But Afghanistan faces an inevitable capture of power by the Taliban, with a resurgent Al Qaida and Islamic State in the shadows. This  theatre of instability can shift across to other regions like West, Central and South Asia. 

Case 2
China and the One Belt Roadway (OBOR or BRI)

Chinese Geo-Political Method: 

1. China never acts in haste, but has a long term, multi-pronged, flexible strategy that is thought through, planned and executed over years, and even decades.  (This is made possible with centralized, command and control Communist Party of China -CPC structures). 

2. China does not acknowledge its own transgressions on laws, treaties, borders,  seas,(Unless it suits Chinese interests) and claims territories and marine areas to be part of Chinese territory or naval rights. China speaks of its ‘peaceful rise’, as opposed to the militarism/ imperialism of the West. China has a slippery conceptualization of its rights and boundaries, tracing its continuity with the ‘Middle Kingdom’ from a feudal period much of which incorporates myth. China’s ‘core interests’ stem from this understanding and are safeguarded by an increasingly powerful modernized military and naval force.

3. China uses small tactical actions:  For example, in May-July 2019 it sent its oil rigging ships and military patrol boats near Malaysian rigs; Philippine reefs; Vietnamese coastal waters in the Vangaurd Reef; near Indian-Russian rigs; Port of Colombo (only Vietnamese patrol boats reacted, while others registered diplomatic complaint). Similarly stray intrusions in the border territories (Bhutan, Nepal, India, Myanmar). These steps appear isolated, piecemeal, and insignificant in the larger geopolitics. Several states believe that these ‘small steps’ by the Chinese do not warrant retaliation. (Mahalingam, 2019) These ‘small steps’ do not cause concern to the international community. However, these small actions are designed to set precedent; become major strategic challenges and ultimately alter the status quo in China’s interests. 

5. Chinese ports being built across the Indian and Pacific Oceans have  dual use: For example, Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, where Sri Lankan Government has signed a 99 years lease agreement, similarly to the ports built in Pakistan (CPEC) proposals include production of military hardware and joint production. China’s first military base in Djibouti is backed by naval ships and hardware. China’s encroachment of the 3200 acres in the Spratly and Paracelsus Islands have transformed to military bases. All other countries from Russia, to the Pacific rim countries have had to accept this. 

6. Geo politics between USA, Russia and China is militarizing and threatening parts of the Asian region. Even as several countries try to leverage one major power against the other. Philippines cancelled the Visiting Forces Agreement with the US. This step can be confirmed as de-militarization, only if the Chinese do not get similar rights from a foreign investment starved Philippines.

8. China claims equal partnership and ‘win-win relationships’, but has a clear division between ‘core national interests’ and partnerships.

9. China talks of its ‘peaceful rise’, as opposed to the militarism and colonialism of the West. President Xi  asserts that while China did not follow the path of expansionism and colonialism, it would not part with “Any inch of territory down from ancestors cannot be lost while we want nothing from others”. (Nagai and Nagasaki, 2018). However China has a slippery conceptualization of its territorial and maritime boundaries, tracing its nation to the myths of ‘Middle Kingdom’. There are ongoing legal disputes on the International laws of the Sea. 

10. China has consistently tried to pressurize smaller states to ensure Chinese core interests. For example, Chinese asserting its security interests in Tajikistan, where this CAS shares a 1,300 km border with Afghanistan, dominates the economy. At the same time, small states leverage their relations between the multiple actors in Asia for gains. 

11. China’s 10th white paper (2019) on national defense asserts its right to defend its core interests, and protecting its inalienable territories in East China Sea, South China Sea and with India. China is building world class military in keeping with its international status.

12. China focuses on state relations, and little interest in people, or environment, civil society. In Pakistan before CPEC only 1% of fuel used was coal, now after Chinese investment in Thar desert, 70% coal use. BRI used for exporting excess capacity in old inefficient and carbon heavy industries of China. (Duara, 2019) Also Chinese  policies remain non transparent. Many countries have become indebted from Kenya (Port Mombasa), Sri Lanka, and others to China.

These two case studies show that common security network is not easy yet critical for Asian countries since they are interdependent in their goals for growth and development. 

Conclusion

A common security network proposed bu peace and interlinked groups should appeal and focus on (1) including, incorporating the smaller states, who are more vulnerable to great power interventions. This should be proposed without targeting any other power. (2) A common security policy should appeal to regional organizations and their secretariats. (3) It should be submitted to key multi-lateral and international institutions. 

References 

Duara, Prasenjit (2019) Interview, Times of India, April 19, 

Mahalingam, V. Brigadier, (2019) ‘What are the Chinese up to on the other side of the Indian Borders in Tibet and their Implications’ Occasional Paper, Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) at:
https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/what-are-the-chinese-up-to-on-the-other-side-of-the-indian-borders-in-tibet_0.pdf

Nagai Oki and T. Nagasaki, (2018) China cannot lose ‘any inch’ of territory, Xi tells Matis, Nikkei Asian Review, June 28, 2018, at https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-cannot-lose-any-inch- quoted President Xi to to US Defense Secretary Mattis 2018.